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Primal Christian Life Experience and Eschatological Time 
Martin Heidegger#s Early Lectures on the Phenomenology of Religion  
 
István FEHÉR  M. 
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, 
Andrássy Universität  Budapest 
 
Keywords: phenomenology, religion, phenomenology of religion, theology, 
eschatology, time, life, experience, Christianity, theoretical comportment, 
hermeneutics 
 
Abstract: The turning away from theoretical comportment and the concurrent 
attempt to gain  new access to life as it is being pre-theoretically enacted and lived ! 
the effort to go back to original experience and to find a conceptuality adequate to it 
! are parallel developments in German philosophy and theology at the turn of the 
19th and 20th century.  In his effort to find a hermeneutic return to $life%, for the 
young Heidegger ! as is shown by his lectures on the phenomenology of religion ! 
primal Christianity appeared as a fundamental paradigm. / It was by the hermeneutic 
transformation of Husserlian phenomenology that Heidegger attempted to make life 
accessible ! life as it was experienced in primal Christianity and had been described 
in The Epistles of Paul. From this perspective, the religious-theological relevance of 
the interrelated structure of $Erlebnis%, $experience%, and $understanding% originates 
from the hermeneutic-phenomenological thematization and unravelling of the 
believing comportment, of how the believer enacts his/her faith. The paper 
undertakes the attempt to reconstruct the young Heidegger&s path of thinking with an 
eye to some major themes of the phenomenology of religion course, with special 







During the winter semester at the University of Freiburg in 1920-1921, the young 
Martin Heidegger, still a  $Privatdozent% at that time, held lectures on the 
phenomenology of religion whose fame passed far beyond the walls of the 
university, and their echo disseminated all over Germany. The lecture series, or any 
part of it, remained unpublished: Heidegger had published nothing for 10 years 
                                                 I am indebted to the Hungarian National Research Fund [OTKA] for its support; project 
number: OTKA K-75840. This paper is an expanded version, completed with notes, of a 
lecture held at the conference Religious life, experience, and understanding  from  legal, 
philosophical, and theological perspectives, organized by the Department of Philosophy of 
the Faculty of Law of ELTE, the Békés Gellért Ecumenical Institute of Pannonhalma 
(BGÖI), and the Goldziher Institute for Inter-confessional Dialogue, held at the Faculty of 
Law and Political Sciences of ELTE, Budapest, November 6-7, 2009.  
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before his major work, Being and Time, appeared in 1927. The student notes and 
accounts on the course on the phenomenology of religion circulated among students 
and professors, philosophers and theologians in more and more copies. The content 
of the lectures spread for decades among scholars all over the world in the form of 
five different sets of student notes, in a sort of underground way, as a secret 
sensation, to which only the initiated and the privileged had access. When in the late 
1980s I researched in the Hegel Archive at Bochum ! whose director was Otto 
Pöggeler, one of the most outstanding scholars of Heidegger&s lifework and author 
of what still remains one of the fundamental monographs on Heidegger ! I 
considered it as a sign of honor and trust toget a copy of one of these notes, one of 
the Nachschrifts kept at the Husserl Archives in Leuven. In his fundamental 
contribution at the representative conference organized in Bonn on the 100 years 
anniversary of Heidegger&s birth, the eminent American Heidegger scholar and 
translator, Theodore Kisiel, formulated the desideratum that the 1920-1921 course in 
the phenomenology of religion should be published.1 This happened eventually in 
the mid-1990s, but not in the most adequate form. The manuscript of this famous 
course has not been preserved, or at least it has not been found even to this day; the 
lectures were thus published in 1995, as volume 60 of the complete works, based on 
the reconstruction of student notes. Student notes as authentic sources were regarded 
with mistrust by Heidegger himself,2 and from a philological point of view the text 
should be treated with caution indeed.3 
                                                 
1 See Theodore Kisiel, $Edition und Übersetzung. Unterwegs von Tatsachen zu Gedanken, 
von Werken zu Wegen,% in Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers. Symposium der 
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung vom 24.-28. April 1989 in Bonn  Bad Godesberg. Vol. 3: 
Im Spiegel der Welt: Sprache, Übersetzung, Auseinandersetzung, ed. D. Papenfuß und O. 
Pöggeler (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992), 89!108, 97f.: $Man hat immer noch die 
Hoffnung, daß die vielbesprochene &Religions&-Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1920/21, die 
nur [...] in fünf verschiedenen Nachschriften vorhanden ist, einmal herausgegeben wird%.  
 Bibliographical note: as usually in the scholarship, I refer to Heidegger&s complete 
works as GA (Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, from 1975 onwards), and 
to Gadamer&s complete works as GW (Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1!10, Tübingen: Mohr, 
1985!1995), followed by volume and (after comma) page numbers. Other abbreviation: SZ = 
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 15th edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979). 
2 When asked about the Hegel-edition, Heidegger reminded of his earlier remark that 
students& lecture notes are nothing else than $obscure sources% ($Nachschriften sind freilich 
trübe Quellen%); See Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 91; he even 
expressed his hope, precisely with regard to the Hegel-edition, that he will escape this fate. 
See: Hartmut Buchner, $Fragmentarisches,% in Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, ed. 
Günther Neske (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), 47!51, 50 f. Now, if we look at the existing 
editions of Heidegger&s works, we may definitely say: he did not escape this fate. And in this 
case it is perhaps better that he did not.  
3 Respectably, the editor&s epilogue does address this circumstance. $A text which is 
produced in this way [namely, based on student notes]%, writes the editor, $in terms of 
authenticity cannot be compared with textual editions based on original manuscripts% 
(Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, ed. M. Jung, T. Regehly, C. 
Strube. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 60. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995) [henceforth 
referred to as GA 60], 341). Comparing the texts of previous complete works editions with 
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 The volume is entitled: The phenomenology of religious life 
(Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens). The editor&s afterword lets us know that 
this title derives from an inscription on a notebook cover, which comprised 
Heidegger&s lectures on the phenomenology of religion. Another cover contains the 
original title: The phenomenology of religious consciousness (Phänomenologie des 
religiösen Bewußtseins). Heidegger later crossed off the word $consciousness% 
(Bewußtsein) on this notebook cover, and replaced it with $life% (Leben). For 
whoever is acquainted with the evolution of Heidegger&s thinking after the First 
World War and his in-depth confrontation of Husserlian phenomenology, the idea 
comes obviously to mind: this term replacement in its laconic form is suitable for 
characterizing Heidegger&s entire hermeneutic turn and evolution in the 1920s. In 
other words: the Neo-Kantian and Husserlian notion of $consciousness% is replaced 
by $life%. A word is erased, and its place is taken by another. Now, provided we 
know nothing of this event or development, the title still remains meaningful (The 
phenomenology of religious life), but our knowledge of the erased textual- or title-
version bears such a surplus of information that yields a more nuanced and accurate 
understanding of the text since it implies an extra result (or station) of Heidegger&s  
critical dialogues with contemporary philosophical schools and his inner personal 
development.  
 
II. The intellectual climate of the turn of the century: crisis and reorientation 
Having referred to contemporary schools, it will not be superfluous to take a short 
glimpse at the turn-of-the-century intellectual climate, for a better embedding and 
contextualization of our research. The young Heidegger&s path as a thinker was 
shaped against the background of the radical and fundamental changes or retunings 
of the turn-of-the-century intellectual environment, and this path can be regarded 
itself as one of the outstanding expressions of this retuning. This change extends 
from the gradual awareness of the crisis of classical bourgeois culture and of the 
idea of progress in the last decades of the 19th century to the open emergence of this 
                                                                                                                              
the original manuscripts, Theodore Kisiel has compiled several errata lists, deriving from 
misreadings or erroneous interpretations. Taking into account that in this case there is no 
original manuscript, only student notes, the case of misreading can also be coupled with 
mishearing. At any rate, it is worth mentioning that on page 79 there is a remark on the fact 
that from the point of view of phenomenological understanding, the rational-irrational notion 
pair only has a $restricted legitimacy% ($beschränktes Recht%), and that $what is called an 
indissoluble rest for the mind% ($vom für die Vernunft unauflöslichen Rest%) is nothing else 
than an aesthetic play. In the very same context, on page 131 the text reads: $unauflösbaren 
Recht%. Considering the context and Heidegger&s language use ! and last but not least the 
above mentioned phrasing ! one could hazard a guess that it should read $Rest% instead of 
$Recht% in the second case. For somewhat more details on Heidegger&s complete works 
edition, see István Fehér M., $Szövegkritika, kiadástörténet, interpretáció. A történeti-kritikai 
és az életmĦkiadások filológiai-hermeneutikai problémái% (Textual criticism, edition history, 
interpretation. Pilological and hermeneutical problems of historical-critical and lifework 
editions), in Filológia  interpretácó   médiatörténet (Philology ! interpretation ! media 
history), ed. Pál Kelemen, Zoltán Kulcsár-Szabó, Attila Simon, and György Tverdota 
(Budapest: Ráció, 2009), 56!151, 138 ff.  
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crisis at the end of the First World War. For a better understanding of the events, it 
will be useful to go back to the retrospective account of one of Heidegger&s 
outstanding contemporaries, eye witness, and closest disciple, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer.1  
 The traumas of the First World War, wrote Gadamer in retrospection, 
shattered the faith in progress, and questioned the values of liberal culture. This is 
not to say that the first signs of this trauma were not already perceivable before the 
catastrophe of WWI; but the general crisis of the age consciousness only surfaced 
openly after the war. The faith in progress and the consciousness of bourgeois 
culture were shaken and became problematic in their very foundations. The change 
in the thinking of the age was signalled by the fact that the ruling philosophy, 
Kantian critical idealism ! which had been the leading and most influential 
intellectual school all over Europe in the age of emerging bourgeoisie, from late19th 
century to the end of WWI ! suddenly lost its ground. As Gadamer writes: $In the 
First World War&s grisly trench warfare and heavy artillery battles for position, the 
neo-Kantianism which had up to then been accorded a truly worldwide acceptance, 
though not undisputed, was just as thoroughly defeated as was the proud cultural 
consciousness of that whole liberal age, with its faith in scientifically based 
progress.%2 The increasing cultural crisis, the sense of an intensifying loss of 
perspective and values appeared on ever larger scales. The change of this general 
attitude was indisputably signalled by the works of Paul Ernst and Oswald Spengler, 
already in their titles. The Collapse of German Idealism, as Paul Ernst called it in 
one of the most influential books of the age, was placed in a world historical context 
by Oswald Spengler&s The Decline of the West; this work predicted the end of a 
culture in a prophetic tone. The sense of cultural collapse and catastrophe surfaced 
with an elementary force.  
 The criticism of Neo-Kantianism was preceded by two important events: 
Nietzsche&s criticism of Platonism and Christianity, and Kierkegaard&s annihilating 
criticism of speculative idealism. In opposition to the one-sided methodological 
orientation of Neo-Kantianism, two new catchwords were introduced and 
disseminated in a wide circle. One was the term of life, especially that of the 
irrationality of historical life, with a possible reference to Nietzsche and Bergson, as 
well as Dilthey. The other was the key term of existence, the new concept which 
emerged from Kierkegaard&s works, whose influence was increasing all over 
Germany due to the Diederichs-edition. Similarly to Kierkegaard&s objection to 
Hegel&s forgetting the existence of the individual being, the complacent 
methodologism and systematicism of Neo-Kantians, which subordinated philosophy 
completely to the task of founding and legitimizing scientific knowledge, became 
now also harshly criticized. Karl Jaspers&s 1919 book, Psychologie der 
Weltanschauungen, as the first important work of German existential philosophy, 
                                                 
1 For the following, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, $Die Wahrheit des Kunstwerks,% in Gadamer, 
GW 3, 249 ff.  
2 Gadamer, $Autobiographical Reflections,% in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later 
Writings, ed. and transl. by Richard Palmer (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 2007), 6. 
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was centred on the concept of existence, going back to Kierkegaard: the term 
meaning that volatile inner core of the individual which is inaccessible to any kind 
of conceptual fixation or illumination. And similar to the way Kierkegaard, the 
Christian thinker, stood up against the philosophy of idealism, the self-criticism of 
dialectic theology opened up now a new age.  
 The change of the intellectual climate, the radical transformation of the 
philosophical awareness of the age, left theology naturally not unaffected either. The 
passionate revolt against the seemingly self-assured culture of the fathers, which 
Gadamer spoke about, the critical confrontation with the intellectual orientation of 
the older generation ! a paradigm shift, as it were ! was no less characteristic for 
theology than for philosophy or other spheres of culture. This also explains why 
both theology and philosophy of this new generation, affected by the changed spirit 
of the age, and primarily protestant theology and Heidegger, could join hands and 
develop a lasting spiritual relationship with each other. After World War One, in 
which the consciousness of cultural idealism was dissolved in the battles of 
materials, the new theology, as Gadamer writes, was nothing less fierce than 
existential philosophy in confronting the liberal traditions of the 19th century.1 The 
fundamental experience of this generation was the disappointment with liberal 
culture and the idea of progress, and ! related to it ! the search for new ways and 
orientations. The years following the war, wrote the Heidegger disciple Karl Löwith,  
$were characterized by the criticism of all traditions and every institution of the 
present; [#] we lived with the knowledge that nothing prevalent can remain 
prevalent unless we problematize it and renew it starting from its foundations [#].%2  
 Approaching the subject of Heidegger&s lectures on the phenomenology of 
religion ! and the title of the present paper as well ! it is of special importance to 
note that the changed intellectual climate was marked in theology by a novel interest 
in primal Christianity and ! parallel with it ! that which was characteristic for 
primal Christianity: eschatology. Both of these: primal Christianity and eschatology 
were synonymous with turning away from the world ! meaning, in this case, the 
world of bourgeois culture and values. The new generation, grown up in the 
awareness of crisis, formulated the following accusation: for the theology of the 
bourgeois age, religion has been dissolved in history. The eschatological thinking of 
the primal Christian community and the expectation of the end of the world was 
seen as being at odds with early modern cultural consciousness and the gradual 
secular, historical materialization of religion, the emphasis having been laid on the 
distance between the church and the world.3 At the same time, this also explains 
why, in contrast with the outstanding representatives of the previous generation, 
who had not refrained from taking historical and political stances, and had publicly 
                                                 
1 Gadamer, GW 4, 75. 
2 Karl Löwith, Heidegger  Denker in dürftiger Zeit, in Idem, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 8. 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1984), 294. 
3 See Otto Pöggeler, $Heidegger és Bultmann: filozófia és teológia% (Heidegger and 
Bultmann: philosophy and theology), trans. Gáspár Csaba László, Vigilia 12 (1996), 920!
927, 921. 
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supported and approved of the aims of the war, the new generation was less 
involved with the historical events.1 
 
III. The confrontation with liberal theology: criticism and tacit linkage 
The change in the orientation of the new generation rising in theology was coupled 
with a passionate criticism of the so-called liberal theology of the older generation. 
The movement is customarily drawn back to Johann Salomo Semler (1725-1791) 
and his work, Institutio ad doctrinam Christianam liberaliter discendam (Halle 
1774), although its first important representative is generally considered to be 
Schleiermacher. The movement&s $liberal% attribute refers to the conviction that ! in 
the sense and as a result of the freedom of consciousness claimed by Luther ! the 
individual has the right to define his/her faith without the dictates of ecclesiastical 
authorities and dogmas. Emphasis falls thus on ethics and the experience of faith 
rather than on articles of  faith and their dogmatic canonization. The starting point is 
the historical Jesus, therefore the historical-critical research of Jesus& life (Leben-
Jesu-Forschung) becomes increasingly important for this approach. In connection to 
this, the reference to reason, the sceptical attitude towards supernatural events, 
mysteries, and miracles, as well as the differentiation between the Jesus of the faith 
and the historical Jesus, in addition to the disputing of ecclesiastical authority, are 
considered central features of the movement. The intention of liberal theology was 
not to undermine the foundations of faith, although, as often stressed, it actually did 
have such results; nevertheless, it much rather strived to make faith, and the truth of 
Christian faith, able to be lived and enacted by modern man, mobilizing and 
employing the humanist-philosophical tradition and modern erudition for this end. It 
endeavoured to avoid the collision of Christian faith and modern scientific thinking.  
 The individually experienced and enacted religiousness has been decisive 
for liberal theology ever since its very beginnings. In Schleiermacher&s famous 
definition of religion, the essence of religion ilies neither in metaphysics, nor in  
morality, but a $different kind of relationship% to the universe; not in thinking, nor 
action, but approach and feeling, namely, a life in the infinite nature of totality,2 of 
wholeness, the feeling of absolute dependence.3 Faith for him is equal to 
unshakeable confidence, meekness, devotion, and is far from metaphysics, ethics, or 
morality. On his view, religion only attains its reality in lived experience!in 
                                                 
1 For instance, in 1968 Karl Barth justified his theological disagreement with his liberal 
teachers, Wilhelm Herrmann, Martin Rade, and Adolf Harnack, by refferring to their attitude 
at the outbreak of the First World War. See: Christian Nottmeier, Adolf von Harnack und die 
deutsche Politik 1890-1930. Eine biographische Studie zum Verhältnis von Protestantismus, 
Wissenschaft und Politik, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie Vol. 124 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2004), 4. 
2 Cf. F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren 
Verächtern (Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1799); see now ed. Rudolf Otto (4th revised ed., 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck < Ruprecht, 1920), 27., 33. 
3 Cf. F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der 
evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, 2 vol. (Berlin: Hendel, s.a.), vol. I., §§ 
4-5., pp. 13ff. ($schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl%, and $Gefühl schlechthinniger 
Abhängigkeit%). 
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experienced religiousness. The orientation towards an individually experienced, 
intimate religiousness is a basic feature of Schleiermacher&s concept of religion. 
When speaking about the $feeling of absolute dependence%, Schleiermacher also 
emphasizes that it does not exclude freedom,1 and therefore the idea of freedom, 
often associated with liberal theology, does also regain its rights. Objective doctrines 
are seen as expressions of an intimately lived religious experience. The secular, 
ecclesiastical appearance and historical role of Christian religion, the increasing role 
of dogmas, and the intolerance in forcing their acceptance and violent dissemination, 
were the major challenges that the movement of liberal theology attempted to react 
upon, and provide an answer to, in its own way.  
 The criticism of liberal theology formulated by the generation growing up 
after First World One, primarily by Barthian dialectical theology or neo-Orthodoxy, 
can be summarized in the following theses: the reduction of religion to ethics, the 
faith in the gradual secular, historical unfolding and accomplishment of the Christian 
message, the perception of Jesus&s person as a moral teacher, the identification of 
God&s reverence with fraternal love, the over-secularization of Christianity on the 
whole, and the attempt to assimilate it to, or at least reconcile it with, worldly culture 
(Kulturprotestantismus).  
 The new generation&s passionate criticism of the previous generations is in 
several important respects surely exaggerate and unfair. Trutz Rendtorff, for 
instance, is presumably right when writing in the introduction to a 1999 edition of 
the influential 1900 work of Adolf von Harnack, one of the prominent 
representatives of liberal theology, entitled Das Wesen des Christentums, that one 
cannot speak of a naïve hope of progress with Harnack either, nor of an uncritical 
adjustment to culture, of which cultural Protestantism was so often accused by the 
generation of theologians following Harnack.2 At a closer look at Harnack&s book, 
indeed, we may see that Christianity for him is not the least dissolved in culture, and 
primal Christianity and eschatology are also not left out of his perspective. Being a 
Protestant theologian, whose relationship to tradition, primarily church tradition 
defined by Catholicism, is ambivalent, it would be strange and baffling indeed if 
primal Christianity did not have an important word to say in his reconstruction of the 
essence of Christianity.3 We should rather say: the new generation places accents on 
other issues, picks up, emphasizes and radicalizes certain tendencies apparent ! 
albeit perhaps not too visibly ! in the works of earlier generations. In this sense 
Heidegger&s return to primal Christianity in his lecture on the phenomenology of 
                                                 
1 Cf. Schleiermacher. Der christliche Glaube, vol. I. § 4, p. 15: $Denken wir uns nun Abhän-
gigkeitsgefühl und Freiheitsgefühl [...] als Eines [...].% 
2 See Trutz Rendtorff&s  remarks between notes 91 and 92 in his Introduction to Adolf von 
Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1999). 
3 At the same time, one of Harnack&s famous theses (expressing the tension of the issue and 
suggesting a resigned-accepting attitude) goes as follows: $»Primal Christianity« had to 
cease in order for »Christianity« to prevail.% (Adolf  von Harnack: Das Wesen des 
Christentums. Sechzehn Vorlesungen vor Studierenden aller Fakultäten im Wintersemester 
1899/1900 an der Universität Berlin, ed. C.-D. Osthövener [Tübingen:  Mohr Siebeck,  
2005], 17: $das »Urchristentum« untergehen mußte, damit das »Christentum« bliebe%). 
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religion can possibly be regarded as the continuation and radicalization of 
Harnackian tendencies. References to Harnack and Harnack&s history of dogmatics 
are indeed not missing from the text;1 for example, Harnack&s harsh criticism of 
dogma2 or the critical remarks regarding the interconnectedness of Christianity and 
Greek philosophy have an enduring echo on the young Heidegger&s path of 
thinking.3 At any rate, Harnack&s theses penetrated the consciousness of the age, and 
acted as a reference framework in the first half of the century.4 As Gadamer 
explicitly claims,5 and as we shall have opportunity to discuss it later on, Heidegger 
took over $the Harnackian thesis of the fatal Hellenization of Christian theology%; 
that is, the thesis which ! whether accepted or not ! was widely circulating at the 
beginning of the century, and which today is again a subject matter of discussion.6  
                                                 
1 Cf. GA 60, 72, and also the lecture on Augustine in the following semester: GA 60, 163. 
2 Harnack&s definition of dogma is as follows: $Das Dogma ist in seiner Conception und in 
seinem Ausbau ein Werk des griechischen Geistes auf dem Boden des Evangeliums%. Adolf  
von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 vols, 4th ed. 1909/10 (reprint Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), vol. 1, 20. See also Heidegger on this: GA 60, 
112. $Es ist auffallend, wie wenig Paulus theoretisch-dogmatisch vorgibt; auch im 
Römerbrief. Die Situation ist keine solche des theoretischen Beweises. Das Dogma als 
abgelöster Lehrgehalt in objektiv-erkenntnismäßiger Abhebung kann niemals leitend für die 
christliche Religiosität gewesen sein, sondern umgekehrt, die Genesis des Dogmas ist nur 
verständlich aus dem Vollzug der christlichen Lebenserfahrung.% The same holds for the 
proofs of God as well: they do not derive so much from authentic religious experience ! as 
its natural extension or a necessity occasioned by it ! but rather signal the prevalence of a 
radically different theoretical interest, which overshadows the religious interest, replaces and 
suppresses it. See: GA 60, 27: $der Gottesbeweis ist nicht ursprünglich christlich, sondern 
hängt von dem Zusammenhang des Christentums mit der griechischen Philosophie ab.% Cf. 
also ibid., 104. 
3 See GA 60, 72., 112., 313. Cf. GA 61, 6. Chapter title: $Vorgängige Gräzisierung des 
christlichen Lebensbewußtseins.% Criticism of dogma already appears in Dilthey, see 
Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, 258.: $So war die 
Entwicklung dieses Gehaltes im Dogma zugleich seine Veräußerlichung.% See also: Dilthey, 
Das Wesen der Philosophie, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, 388 f.: $Man tut der Geschichte 
des Christentums unrecht, wenn man die Aufnahme der Theoreme der griechisch-römischen 
Philosophie nur als ein äußerliches Schicksal ansieht, das ihm durch seine Umgebung 
aufgedrungen sei [...] Und hier verfällt nun die Innerlichkeit der christlichen Religion einem 
tragischen Schicksal. Diese Begriffe [die Dogmen zweiten Grades] isolieren die Momente 
des Lebens, stellen sie gegeneinander.%  
4 For more details about Harnack&s influence on Heidegger, see recently Karl Kardinal 
Lehmann, $»Sagen, was Sache ist«: der Blick auf die Wahrheit der Existenz. Heideggers 
Beziehung zu Luther%, in Heidegger und die christliche Tradition. Annäherungen an ein 
schwieriges Thema, ed. Norbert Fischer, and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2007), 158. 
5 GW 3, 313. 
6 Pope Benedict XVI&s Regensburg Lecture on 12 September 2006 posed anew the question 
of the Hellenization of Christian theology. See on this: Norbert Fischer and Friedrich-
Wilhelm von Herrmann, $Die christliche Botschaft und das Denken Heideggers. Durchblick 
durch das Thema%, in Heidegger und die christliche Tradition, 16. For the Hellenization of 
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IV. Theology and philosophy on Heidegger#s path as a thinker 
Heidegger&s path as a thinker led from theology to philosophy, and this theological 
past ! as a sort of premise, an eternal past ! as a  matter of fact, did never pass away. 
On the contrary: it appeared in ever newer forms, it surfaced again and again in the 
course of Heidegger&s philosophical career of over 50 years. Heidegger himself was 
also aware of it. According to an autobiographical remark in the mid-1950s, 
published a few years later, and thus becoming widely known, he would have never 
reached the path of thinking, that is to say, philosophy, had it not been for his 
theological background.1 Another work, published only in the late-1990s, and 
therefore much less known, written in the second half of the 1930s ! a difficult 
period of his life2 ! and making the impression of an excruciating and tortuous or 
even painful self-examination because of its informal tone, emphatically affirms: 
$Und wer wollte verkennen, daß auf diesem ganzen bisherigen Weg verschwiegen 
die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum mitging ! eine Auseinandersetzung, 
die kein aufgegriffenes »Problem« war und ist, sondern Wahrung der eigensten 
Herkunft ! des Elternhauses, der Heimat und der Jugend ! und schmerzliche 
Ablösung davon in einem. Nur wer so verwurzelt war in einer wirklichen gelebten 
katholischen Welt, mag etwas von den Notwendigkeiten ahnen, die auf dem 
bisherigen Weg meines Fragens wie unterirdische Erdstöße wirkten. Die Marburger 
Zeit brachte dazu noch die nähere Erfahrung eines protestantischen Christentums ! 
alles aber schon als Jenes, was von Grund aus überwunden, nicht aber zerstört 
werden muß.%3 
 Seen from this perspective, Heidegger&s remark on the essence of truth, 
made on the first Marburg lecture in 1923/24, no longer seems so baffling. During 
the entire victorious sweep of the theoretical concept of truth directed towards 
cognition, only once has there been any attempt in European history to render some 
radically new meaning to the idea of truth: in the New Testament ! claimed this 
remark in a way which displayed its own theological background as well.4 
                                                                                                                              
Christianity in Harnack, see: Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums, ed. C.-D. Osthövener, 
118 ($akute Hellenisierung%). 
1 Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 96. $Herkunft aber 
bleibt stets Zukunft,% he added (ibid.). 
2 See Otto Pöggeler, Heidegger in seiner Zeit (München: Fink, 1999), 14. 
3 GA 66, 415. $And who would overlook that I was accompanied on my whole previous way 
by a silent confrontation with Christianity ! a confrontation which has not been, and is not, 
some sort of incidentally raised &problem&; but the protection of the most particular origin: 
the family home, the homeland, and youth ! and at the same time the painful distancing from 
it as well. Only he who became rooted so deeply indeed in a truly experienced Catholic 
world may presume something of the necessities which have advanced me in my path as a 
thinker so far, as some underground earth wave. My period in Marburg has also added to it a 
more intimate experience of Protestant Christianity ! however, all this is something that must 
be surpassed in its foundations, but must not be broken.% On his own theological past as well 
as the penetration of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy into Christian theology or the New 
Testament, see also GA 15, 436ff. 
4 GA 17, 125. Before the publication of the first Marburg lecture it could only be conjectured 
that Heidegger&s problematization of the traditional concept of truth in terms of  the truth of 
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Theology&s task should have been to elaborate this new concept of truth, he goes on 
to argue, but it failed to do so, and instead searched for the possibility of its self-
interpretation ! erroneously ! in the intellectualistic network of Greek philosophy. 
This laconic, yet telling remark, which furthers the problem of the tensioned 
relationship of Christianity and Greek philosophy also pointed out by Harnack, is 
instrumental in drawing attention to the theological background of Heidegger&s early 
philosophical career. As already mentioned, Heidegger explicitly stated in the 1950s 
that he would have never stepped on the path of philosophy without this theological 
past and origin, and that the concept of hermeneutics, central to his thought, had also 
become known to him from his theological studies.1  
                                                                                                                              
cognition and assertion, going hand in hand with the resulting attempt to open up the basic 
stratum of this concept (in terms of the truth of life and existence), could have had religious 
motifs. However, ever since this text has been public, there has been evidence, represented 
by important textual passages, that Heidegger&s investigations and interpretive efforts into 
this subject derived indeed from a religious background, inspired primarily by Augustine and 
the New Testament. In addition to the above-cited passage, see also GA 17, 120, and 128. 
The loci referring to the concept of $the truth of existence% in the Being and Time are also 
relevant: SZ 221., 297., 307.; cf. also 213 ff.; and finally GA 17, 98., a discussion of the fact 
that the [neo-Kantian] concept of truth as validity is not adequate to enforce or 
reveal/approach the truth of historical knowledge, and even less religious truth. ! See more 
recently Markus Enders: $Was ist Wahrheit? Zum Wahrheitsverständnis in der antiken 
Philosophie und im frühen Christentum%, zur debatte. Themen der Katholischen Akademie 
Bayern, 1 (2010): 18!20., who thinks that the Heideggerian interpretation of truth as 
unconcealedness can be justified from the perspective of the New Testament, and the Gospel 
of John in particular. The New Testament, Enders writes, identifies God, or more precisely, 
God transformed into man, with truth; and although the absolute truth is basically the 
essential determinedness of God as a whole, within the divine trinity it refers still, in 
particular, to the Son, and not the Father: the Son is nothing else therefore than the Father&s 
complete unconcealedness or perfect realization. Seen from this perspective, the 
embodiment, the incarnation can very well be described by the Heideggerian term of truth as 
unconcealedness, and Jesus& self-characterization ! $I am the way and the truth and the life% 
(John 14:6) ! in accordance with Hans Urs von Balthasar&s interpretation (see: Theologik II: 
Wahrheit Gottes (Einsiedeln, 1985), 13!23, 13), must be perceived not as Jesus&s merely 
testifying ! or evidencing ! the truth, but as His being truth itself. (Ibid., 20.) Similar 
considerations have also been formulated in German idealism; see for example Hegel&s 
following considerations: $The testimony of the spirit on the content of religion is 
religiousness itself; a testimony which testifies [#] [Spirit] exists only inasmuch as it [#] 
testifies itself, reveals itself, and is manifested.% G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die 
Geschichte der Philosophie, I, in Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie Werkausgabe, eds. E. 
Moldenhauer, K.M. Michel (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp) 1970, vol. 18, p. 94: $Das Zeugnis 
des Geistes vom Inhalt der Religion ist Religiosität selbst; es ist Zeugnis das bezeugt; dieses 
ist zugleich Zeugen. Der Geist zeugt sich selbst und erst im Zeugnis; er ist nur, indem er sich 
zeugt, sich bezeugt und sich zeigt, sich manifestiert.% [Italics added.] 
1 This remark is duly emphasized and appreciated in the literature. However, it receives less 
attention that Heidegger&s remark does not refer to a general interest in hermeneutics, that 
theology and hermeneutics are not interconnected in a general way: hermeneutics is not 
treated as biblical exegesis or ! as with Schleiermacher and Dilthey ! a general science of 
interpretation. Heidegger in his memories refers to a more restricted aspect or concept of 
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Heidegger&s philosophical reorientation after the war had an inner influence 
on the debates around theology&s self-interpretation and conceptual foundations. As 
Gadamer recollects, shortly after his arrival at Marburg, on an evening debate 
following a theological lecture, Heidegger took the floor and explained: $the true 
task of theology, to which it should return, lies in finding the word which is able to 
summon to faith and preserve one in it%. This formulation, according to Gadamer, 
sounded like a real task assignment for theology. The questions which have been 
stirring in Heidegger since the earliest times, thinks Gadamer, were theological 
questions.1 In the 1927 lecture, $Phenomenology and Theology%, Heidegger 
describes theology as the science of faith, highlighting that theology derives from 
faith, from a believing comportment, while its task is to formulate and mediate the 
faith in a conceptual form adequate for this existence.2 This completes the remark in 
Sein und Zeit according to which $theology is seeking a more primordial 
interpretation of man's Being towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself 
and remaining within it,% and $it is slowly beginning to understand once more 
Luther&s insight, that the >foundation& on which its system of dogma rests has not 
                                                                                                                              
hermeneutics, which could be termed $sprachphilosophisch%, because it is particularly 
oriented and connected to language. $At that time I was especially interested in the 
relationship between the word of the Scripture and theological-speculative thinking% ! he 
wrote in Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 96. Heidegger&s remark is occasioned by the discrepancy 
between the verbal expression and dissemination of faith on the one hand, and its written 
recording, transmission and scientific-theological conceptualization on the other. Heidegger 
has perceived this situation as laden with tensions from the very beginning. Later in the 
course of his philosophical path the issue concerning the language and conceptualization 
adequate for faith is tranformed into the issue of the relationship between philosophy and its 
language, being and language. In his autobiographical note quoted above Heidegger 
mentions that hermeneutics was known to him from the same source as to Dilthey, namely 
from his theological studies. However, at a closer look at the matter it becomes apparent that 
Dilthey defined hermeneutics as the science of $life manifestations recorded in writing%, and 
$the interpretation of written records% ($Kunstlehre des Verstehens schriftlich fixierter 
Lebensäußerungen%, $Kunstlehre der Auslegung von Schriftdenkmalen%; see Wilhelm 
Dilthey, $Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik,% in Idem, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 5, 332f., 
320), whereas Heidegger placed emphasis on the $word% right from the beginning. The 
$word% can equally be a live, living word, and a written, transmitted word, as also a dead 
word (the Hungarian term $szó% [word] carries its verbal characteristics already in the 
expression $szóbeli% [verbal]). As revealed by Gadamer&s recollections ! to be quoted later 
on !, Heidegger has always thought that the fundamental problem of theology was the search 
for, and finding of, the right, the adequate word; it consisted, in other words, in the 
linguistical nature of theology in terms of  the tension between orality and literacy. Thus, in a 
way hardly usual and expectable from a philosopher, he tried to protect theology from 
thoughtlessly taking over from time to time some out-dated philosophical conceptuality. The 
fundamental Heideggerian criticism of philosophical and theological tradition springs from 
the same source, and it can be summarized as follows: both philosophy and theology move in 
the conceptuality of a theoretical attitude perfectly inadequate from the point of view of 
living life and living faith.  
1 Gadamer GW 3, 197., 199. cf. GW 1, 72. 
2 Heidegger GA 9, 55 ff, 59. 
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arisen from an inquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this 
>foundation& not only is inadequate for the problematic of theology, but conceals and 
distorts it.% 1 As A. Gethmann-Siefert noted according to Heidegger $religion 
requires a way of treatment adequate for its own logos.%2 
For the thinker grown up in Catholic tradition and seriously facing the 
challenges of Lutheran theology, the most debatable part of the former may have 
been the fact that in the course of its development, the Christianity of Christian 
theology gradually faded and perished; this theology knitted an intellectualistic-
theoretical conceptual network, lent from Greek philosophy, around faith, which not 
only bound up theology, but directly distanced, alienated from it. Influenced by 
Franz Overbeck, Heidegger investigated the relationship of faith and theology, 
religion and theology, and ! as previously referred to ! on the basis of Adolf von 
Harnack&s then groundbreaking works, he accepted the thesis of the fatal 
Hellenization of Christian theology.3 It is thus hardly a coincidence, and indeed a 
sign of consistent thinking, that when Heidegger published his lecture 
$Phenomenology and Theology% in 1969/70, after several decades he once again  
drew attention in its preface to the fact that Franz Overbeck $pointed out that the 
world-denying expectation of the end is the basic characteristic of  primal 
Christianity%.4 
                                                 
1 Heidegger SZ 10/ BT 30; see GA20, 6/4.) 
2 Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert: Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie im Denken 
Martin Heideggers (Freiburg - München: Alber, 1974), 36. 
3 Gadamer GW 3, 313. 
4 Cf. GA 9, 45 f. See on this Otto Pöggeler, Neue Wege mit Heidegger (Freiburg - München: 
Alber, 1992), 482., and also 26, 32, 111. The growing interest in early Christianity and 
eschatological comportment characterizing it was also signalled by the works of Johannes 
Weiß, highly influential in the age ! Heidegger referred to them in his lectures on the 
phenomenology of religion (see GA 60, 133) ! summarized in the posthumous Das 
Urchristenthum. Turning to primal Christianity meant for Weiß too the re-thematization of 
the relationship of religion and theology on decisive points. $[...] seit Paulus ist im 
Christentum Religion und Theologie so eng mit einander verkoppelt, daß es bis zum 
heutigen Tage nicht  möglich gewesen ist, diesen Bund zu lösen. Es ist sehr zu fragen, ob das 
ein Segen für das Christentum gewesen sei. So notwendig die Theologie für die Kirche und 
ihr Verhältnis zur umgebenden Welt ist, so wünschenswert wäre es doch, wenn man im 
Leben des Einzelnen für das Religiöse eine Form finden könnte, bei der das Theologische 
ganz ausgeschaltet bliebe%. ($Ever since Paul, religion and theology have had such a strong 
inter-dependence in Christianity%, writes Weiß, $that it has been impossible to break this 
alliance even to this day. It is important to ask whether this has indeed been a blessing for 
Christianity. It would be desirable to find a form of religion devoid of theology in the life of 
the individual just as much as theology is necessary for the church and its relationship with 
the world.%) Johannes Weiß: Das Urchristenthum, ed. Rudolf Knopf (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck < Ruprecht, 1917), 321 f. This tensioned relationship of religion and theology 
is also echoed in one of Heidegger&s notes in GA 60, 310: $Scharf zu trennen: das Problem 
der Theologie und das der Religiosität. Bei der Theologie ist zu beachten ihre ständige 
Abhängigkeit von Philosophie und der Lage des jeweiligen theoretischen Bewußtseins 
überhaupt. Die Theologie hat bis jetzt keine originäre theoretische Grundhaltung der 
Ursprünglichkeit des Gegenstandes entsprechend gefunden.% ($Sharply separate: the problem 
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of theology and the problem of religiousness. As for theology, its permanent dependence on 
philosophy and the situation of the respective theoretical consciousness must be observed at 
all times. Theology has not found the original theoretical attitude adequate for the originality 
of its subject even to this day.%)  




Seen from this perspective, Being and Time may be considered as a kind of attempt 
to unite both Catholic and Protestant traditions. The Catholic influence is 
perceivable in the ontological orientation emerging in Heidegger under the influence 
of Brentano&s dissertation on Aristotle (Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des 
Seienden nach Aristoteles, 1862) and Carl Braig&s work Vom Sein. Abriß der 
Ontologie (1896) ! the latter creating, while opposing to, the expression of 
modernism!and of Neo-Scholasticism in general; in other words, it is perceivable in 
the fundamental question which determined and accompanied Heidegger&s entire 
path as a thinker from the beginning to the end, namely the meaning, and then the 
truth, of being (in the terminology of his major work, fundamental ontology). The 
Protestant, and primarily Lutheran influence is shown by the emphasis on the 
individual believer, religious experience and enacted life (in the terminology of the 
main opus: existential analytics), expressed in a new kind of reading of Aristotle, 
disrupted from Scholastic interpretations, and favouring practical philosophy, and 
also in the reception of, and reference to, medieval mysticism, Luther, 
Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and the tradition of the philosophy of life.1 In 
one of the endpoints of the methodological reflections in the introductory part of the 
Being and Time, Heidegger concludes that fundamental ontology is to be sought in 
existential analytics;2 this well-known, thesis-like formulation ! which of course 
marks a significant tension in the relationship of the two disciplines,3 a tension 
which in a sense becomes the reason for the incompleteness of this great work ! is in 
fact a concise expression of the attempt to synthesize the two great Christian 
traditions.   
 
V. The influence of Husserlian phenomenology 
It is hardly possible to treat here all the fundamental philosophical influences that 
the young Heidegger took up in his thinking; however, the previously sketched 
image must be completed at one point. It is about the decisive influence of 
Husserlian phenomenology on the young Heidegger&s development as a thinker. In 
the late 1910s and early 1920s, Heidegger was completely immersed in an inner 
discussion with phenomenology, therefore it is not superfluous to follow up some of 
the instances of this discussion.  
 The phenomenology elaborated by Husserl conceived of itself as a basically 
descriptive science. Its purpose is the description of phenomena as they directly 
reveal themselves. The rejection of any theoretical construction which has not 
                                                 
1 In August 1917, a few months after his wedding, as a belated celebration of his wife&s 
birthday, Heidegger gave an inspiring speech in a private circle on Schleiermacher&s work 
Über die Religion. See Otto Pöggeler, Schritte zu einer hermeneutischen Philosophie 
(Freiburg - München: Alber, 1993), 14., 389.; Idem, Heidegger in seiner Zeit, 250. 
2 $Daher muß die Fundamentalontologie, aus der alle andern erst entspringen können, in der 
existenzialen Analytik des Daseins gesucht werden% (SZ §. 4, p. 13.) 
3 I tried to expose these ideas in more detail at the end of my Introduction to the Hungarian 
translation of the Being and Time: Fehér M., Introduction to Lét és idĘ (Being and Time) by 
Martin Heidegger (Budapest: Gondolat, 1989), 50 ff.) 
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justified itself in $presentive intuition% is essential here;1 it is solely by $presentive 
intuition% and adequate description rather than by the mere authority of 
philosophical tradition that any concept or theory can be justified.2  
 Heidegger&s appropriation of Husserl&s phenomenology was accompanied 
from the very beginning by motifs derived from life-philosophy and historicism. 
Heidegger&s hermeneutic turn following the First World War meant returning to 
man&s concrete life, to $actual life% and $life experience%. This return to, and 
concern with, actual life conceived of itself at the same time as a return to the 
$origins%, and this is how Heidegger critically took up, and committed himself to, 
Husserl&s phenomenology. However, the origin for Heidegger, distinctly from 
Husserl, was not  transcendental consciousness (with its meaning-giving acts, its 
immanence and intentional life), but actual, historical, experienced life; this is the 
source of meaning, the original starting point of philosophy and its conceptuality. 
On Heidegger&s view, the intentional being must be experienced in a way more 
authentic, more $natural%, $unprejudiced% ! that is to say, more $phenomenological% 
! than was the case with Husserl. Husserl&s $natural comportment% becomes thus 
more radical with Heidegger, and gets transformed into a $hermeneutic of facticity%, 
and later, in the Being and Time, $existential analytics%.  
 Husserl&s phenomenology proclaimed as well as committed itself to the 
principle $Back to the things themselves"% For this reason it favoured intuitive 
evidence in contrast to all kinds of constrained argumentation or deduction. 
Heidegger enthusiastically accepted both principles ! as well as the view that any 
philosophy worthy of this name and taking itself seriously is phenomenology !, but 
already at the beginning of his hermeneutic turn, in 1919, he transformed and 
developed intuitive evidence into $understanding evidence% [verstehende Evidenz].3 
On a lecture held in the same year he spoke about $hermeneutic intuition% 
[hermeneutische Intuititon],4 and he emphasized that the main thing in philosophy is 
                                                 
1 $The expression »phenomenology« as Husserl used it% ! writes Hans-Georg Gadamer ! 
$was in a polemical opposition with all theoretical constructions deriving from any obscure 
systematic constraint%. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heideggers Wege (Tübingen: Mohr, 1983), 
104.  
2 See Husserl's $principle of all principles% in Ideas I, § 24:  \No conceivable theory can 
make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary presentive 
intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its 
`personal' actuality) offered to us in `intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented 
as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there\ (Ideas Pertaining  to a 
Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy First Book. General 
Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, translated by F. Kersten, Husserl, Collected Works, 
vol. 2, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983, p. 44; see Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie ' 
24, Husserliana, III/1, p. 51: $Am Prinzip aller Prinzipien, daß jeder originär gebende 
Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der 'Intutition' 
originär (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, 
als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt, kann uns keine 
erdenkliche Theorie irre machen.%) 
3 GA 56/57, 126. 
4 GA 56/57, 117. 
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$to understand by looking at the thing% [zuschauend zu verstehen].1  For both Husserl 
and Heidegger the essential issue to decide philosophical  debates is nothing  else 
but the things themselves, i.e., the way in which things themselves are. But what it 
comees down to for Heidegger is not the way things are in consciousness, but they 
way they appear in actual human life. This is how Heidegger came to understand 
Husserl&s password $Back to the things themselves"%:  back to how they happen to 
present themselves (rather than in and for transcendental consciousness) in actual 
life. And, as a matter of fact, the fundamental mode of actual life is hardly a 
contemplative-theoretical kind of relating to things.  
 The struggle against theoretical comportment, in an attempt to comply with 
life not in the (deduced) conceptuality of $theory%, but on the level of actual 
experience, and the effort to find one&s way back, and regain access, to this level, 
while finding the adequate concepts, the language for it ! were equally decisive 
characteristics of German philosophy and theology at the turn of the century. When 
Heidegger in his hermeneutic effort turned back to actual life ! and began making it 
speak in a new, particular language !, the above-mentioned religious-theological 
motifs were probably influencing his thinking. And indeed, as we shall soon see: 
from the point of view of his hermeneutic return to $life%, for Heidegger ! as is 
apparent in his lectures on the phenomenology of religion ! primal Christianity 
emerged as a decisive paradigm. 
 Indeed, Heidegger attempted to interpret the concept of life of life-
philosophy by thematizing religious life; the particular time structure of the latter 
(and its eschatological nature) was later built into the parts on temporality of his 
major work. Two efforts meet thus in the concept of religious life. Heidegger&s 
answer to the question $what is life?% is the following: it is religious life. His answer 
to the other question, $what is religion?%, is the same: it is religious life. But, since 
the questions and their directions are different, the meaning of the answers is also 
different. In the first case the intended meaning is approximately this: life can be 
truly unravelled through religious life; it is in and by religious life that life can 
actually  be experienced as what it is; it is religious life that really knows, and from 
which it can be read off,  what life really is. In the second case the answer is a stance 
taken in the theological disputes of the time, a latent connection to Schleiermacher 
and Harnack, and at the same time a critical distancing from certain self-
interpretations of religion and theology (theoretical-intellectualistic forms, alienated  
from faith): religion is primarily not doctrine, not theory, but ! life.2  
                                                 
1 GA 56/57, 65.  
2 This approach continues in the 1950s, when Heidegger speaks about the metaphysical and 
ontotheological concept of God, about God as causa sui as follows: $Man cannot pray to this 
God, nor commune with Him. Man cannot fall down to his knees in front of the causa sui, 
nor play music or dance for Him%. Compared to this, he adds, god-less thinking, which gives 
up the God of philosophy, the causa sui, is perhaps closer to the true, divine God. Martin 
Heidegger, $Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik,$ in Idem,  Identität und 
Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), 35!73, 70 f., and also GA 11, 51!79, 77. See my 
studies for more details, István Fehér M., $Der göttliche Gott. Hermeneutik, Theologie und 
Philosophie im Denken Heideggers,% in Das Spätwerk Heideggers. Ereignis  Sage  
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VI. The structure of the lecture on the phenomenology of religion 
The lecture on the phenomenology of religion consists of two larger parts: an 
introductory, methodological-logical part, and the interpretation of the Epistles of 
Paul. The introduction starts with considerations in logics and the philosophy of 
language concerning philosophical concept formation, and discusses these topics in 
ever wider, concentric circles. The problem of the linguistic medium (the 
conceptuality, the linguisticality) of philosophizing has been a concern of Heidegger 
ever since the earliest times, it appeared already in his habilitation paper ! this point 
of view was in fact just as decisive for Heidegger&s preliminary understanding of the 
task of theo-logy (as a talk about God, or the conceptual elaboration and verbal 
mediation of faith) ! and it also meant one of the fundamental, if not the most 
fundamental, impulses for his hermeneutic turn after the war. Heidegger&s concept 
of language and concept formation underlying as well as outlining at the same time, 
his early hermeneutical thinking centres around the concept of $formal indication% 
[formale Anzeige], and leads to the treatment of fundamental problems such as $the 
language of philosophy% or the conceptuality of philosophy in general (the case is 
similar with the language and conceptuality of theology, although Heidegger does 
not treat it just as thoroughly). Form this perspective, it is important, but not 
sufficient, to simply find a new object for philosophy (namely, actual life): a new 
language, a new conceptuality $tailored% to this new object must also be found, such 
that may render and make accessible this new object adequately, in its absolute 
originality. Heidegger&s objection to the entire European philosophical-theological 
tradition can be summarized by saying that its $theories% derive from a $theoretical% 
comportment which is only secondary from the point of view of actual life, actual 
experience, and therefore they speak the language deriving form this kind of 
relation. That is why this language and this comportment cannot do justice for, or 
comply with, actual life and life experience. It is this consideration which, after the 
First World War, leads Heidegger to the theory of $formale Anzeige%, and this is 
where such views appear ! in the unpublished review on Jaspers, for instance ! that 
the products of philosophical interpretation are so-called $hermeneutic concepts% 
which are not abstract or freely floating, but gain their meaning in the course of  the 
particular interpretation being discussed.1 A main characteristic of $formale 
Anzeige% is that it points to a certain direction, it signals, draws and directs 
attention, instead of defining or designating an object. Philosophy is usually not 
understood because it is approached with a wrong theory of language; it is tacitly 
assumed that language is always objectifying. Characteristic for the concept of 
$formale Anzeige% is its nature of $attracting attention%, and this pertains to the 
                                                                                                                              
Geviert, ed. Damir Barbariü (Würzburg: Königshausen < Neumann, 2007), 163!190.; Idem, 
$Die Gottesfrage im Denken Martin Heideggers,% in Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie, ed. 
Hans-Dieter Klein, vol. XXXIX/2007 (Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller Universitätsverlag, 2008), 
141!164.; Idem, $Heideggers Kritik der Ontotheologie,%  in Religion und Gott im Denken 
der Neuzeit, ed. Albert Franz and Wilhelm G. Jacobs (Paderborn ! München ! Wien ! 
Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000), 200!223. 
1 GA 9, 32.  
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applicative moment of hermeneutics.1 Human life is not a static being but 
movement, mobility, and the categories of hermeneutics are characteristically 
$Bewegungskategorien%, $formally indicative%.2 This is most spectacularly 
epitomized, as Heidegger himself acknowledges, by the concept of $running forth to 
death%, $Vorlaufen zum Tode%, $Vorlaufen in den Tod%.3  
                                                 
1 Of the many occurrences, see first of all GA 59, 85. Cf. also ibid., 29., 61 f, 74., 97., 173., 
190. In his lectures during the 1920s, Heidegger repeatedly treated the subject of $formale 
Anzeige%, which concentrated for him the question of the linguistic-conceptual nature of 
philosophy; see GA 9, 9 ff, 29; GA 58, 248 f; GA 60, 54 ff; GA 61, 20., 32 ff, 60., 66 f, 113., 
116., 134., 141., 175.; GA 63, 85.; GA 21, 410.; GA 29/30, 421 ff, 441 ff, 491. On the 
character of $attracting attention,% see especially GA 29/30, 429. (Gadamer also refers to this 
aspect; see GW 3, 316.) The weight of the issue is well marked by Heidegger&s committed 
statement made in this lecture: $Alle philosophischen Begriffe sind formal anzeigend% 
(Every philosophical concept has a formal indicative nature). GA 29/30, 425. A bracketed 
remark of the young Heidegger&s unpublished review on Jaspers also pointed in this 
direction (GA 9, 10 f.), and it is not subsidiary to our subject that Heidegger also noted there, 
that as long as we fail to consider this nature of the philosophical $method% and 
conceptuality, we would only deal with a $surrogate concept% ($Begriffssurrogat%), which 
presents itself as the true phenomenon, but its possibility of experience vanishes and $it will 
only remain correct by the sound of the word% (lediglich noch dem Wortlaut nach richtig 
bleibt). Ibid., 10. (Emphasis mine, I. M. F.) The expression $formale Anzeige% appears on 
occasions in the terminology of Being and Time, not very often though, only around half a 
dozen times, but without any reference to its theoretical background or considerations; that is 
to say ! to be stylish in formulation ! without attracting the least attention to itself (cf. SZ 
114., 116., 117., 231., 313., 315.) On this issue, see: Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin 
Heideggers, 2nd ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), 271 f.; Daniel O. Dahlstrom, $Heidegger's 
Method: Philosophical Concepts As Formal Indications%, The Review of Metaphysics 4 (1994): 
775!795; Th. C. W. Oudemans, $Heidegger's &logische Untersuchungen&%, Heidegger 
Studies 6 (1990): 85!105, 93 ff. Ever since Theodore Kisiel formulated in his fundamental 
monograph the view that $formale Anzeige% is nothing less than $the very heart and soul of 
the early Heidegger% (Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger!s Being and Time 
[Berkeley ! Los Angeles ! London: University of California Press, 1993], 172), Heidegger 
scholarship has received new impulses, and the literature on this subject is increasing, 
especially in the English-speaking world; see lately more studies in S.J. McGrath and 
Andrzej WierciĔski, eds., A Companion to Heidegger!s Phenomenology of Religious Life 
(Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2010), Elementa ! Schriften zur Philosophie und ihrer 
Problemgeschichte, vol. 80, first  of all,  S.J. McGrath, $Formal Indication, Irony, and the 
Risk of Saying Nothing%, 179!205; Jean Greisch, $Heidegger&s Methodological Principles 
for Understanding Religious Phenomena%, 137!138, especially 141 ff; Jennifer Anna 
Gosetti-Ferencei, $The Poetics of World: Origins of Poetic Theory in Heidegger&s 
Phenomenology of Religious Life%, 239!262, e.g. 239: $Formal indication anticipates poetic 
dwelling; the structure of Pauline proclamation anticipates poetic calling%; and Gerhard Ruff, 
$Present History: Reflections on Martin Heidegger&s Approach to Early Christianity%, 233!
238, e.g. 236.: $The first part of the lecture [...] culminates in Heidegger&s central 
methodological concept: formal indication%). 
2 Heidegger, GA 61, 113 ff., 117 ff., 142., 174.; SZ 392.; GA 21, 410.; GA 29/30, 425 ff; GA 
61, 32 ff, 93.; GA 63, 16., 80. 
3 GA 29/30, 425 f. 
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 This introductory part of the lecture on the phenomenology of religion is not 
at all self-sufficient: it apparently serves the purpose of finding the linguistic 
medium adequate for the subsequent interpretation of the Epistles of Paul, the 
context for their interpretation, while permanently facing the difficulty that the 
(linguistic, what else?) attempts to warn against erroneous linguistic attitude in the 
audience ! exactly inasmuch as they are not unfounded ! are also misunderstood. 
Therefore the statement (or $warning%, if you&d like) is placed right at the beginning 
of the introduction: $All of you ! with little exception ! always misunderstand all 
the concepts and definitions I give [#]%.1   
 The conceptuality used in the sense of $formale Anzeige% is entirely 
characteristic of Heidegger&s philosophical language usage; theoretical reflections 
on the matter repeatedly appear, in the decade between the late 1910s and the late 
1920s, in his various lectures, in shorter or longer treatment, sometimes even in the 
range of several pages (as in the lecture on the phenomenology of religion or 
towards the end of the 1929/30 lecture) ! but a thorough analysis is still missing. 
Several signs indicate that Heidegger did attempt to provide some kind of a 
temporary theoretical clarification of the concept of $formale Anzeige% exactly here, 
at the end of the introductory part of the lecture on the phenomenology of religion: 
he articulated the problem of philosophical concept formation, $formal indication% 
cliamed to be the $theory% of the phenomenological method2 in ever more profound 
circles, when this part unexpectedly interrupts without any transition. In Theodore 
Kisiel&s pertinent expression, the lecture ! at least from this point of view ! has 
remained to be a cursus interruptus.3 
 What exactly happened, is described by various anecdotes of Heidegger&s 
former disciples. According to the dramatic version, one or several students 
denounced Heidegger to the Dean ! it is more likely, however, that they only went 
to complain or made some critical comments. Almost five weeks of the semester had 
already passed, Christmas was approaching, and the students were expecting the 
reading of Paul&s letters to convey them some kind of a  moving, edifying message 
(at any rate, some sort of a religion), but instead Heidegger kept serving them 
preparatory, abstract logical meditations ! such as the detailed discussion of the 
difference between generalization and formalization in Husserl&s works. The Dean 
might have given instructions to Heidegger ! whether there was any reaction or 
manifestation during the lectures themselves, is unknown. Be it as it may, the hope ! 
not completely unfounded, as seen from the preliminaries of the previous classes ! 
for a temporary theoretical clarification of $formale Anzeige% did not come true 
because of this incident.4 Oskar Becker&s lecture notes stop right in the middle of a 
                                                 
1 GA 60, 16: $Ich möchte behaupten, daß sämtliche von ihnen, von ganz wenigen 
Ausnahmen abgesehen, die sämtlichen Begriffe und Bestimmungen, die ich Ihnen gebe, 
beständig mißverstehen [...].% 
2 GA 60, 55. 
3 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger!s Being and Time, 170. 
4 This interruption, writes Kisiel, came at a very unfortunate moment, since we fail to hear 
Heidegger&s always valuable and often creative summary of his previous class, which at that 
point would have been the synopsis of $formal indication.% $Formal indication% pertains,  as 
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sentence,1 and then they continue, without any transition, with Heidegger&s 
following remarks ! not lacking any annoyance and resignation, but still quite 
enigmatic in want of more background knowledge !: $Philosophie, wie ich sie 
auffasse, ist in einer Schwierigkeit. Der Hörer in anderen Vorlesungen ist von 
vornherein gesichert: In kunsgeschichtlicher Vorlesung kann er Bilder sehen, in 
anderen kommt er für sein Examen auf die Kosten. In der Philosophie ist es anders, 
und ich kann daran nichts ändern, da ich die Philosophie nicht erfunden habe. Ich 
möchte mich aber doch aus dieser Kalamität retten und daher diese so abtrakten 
Betrachtungen abbrechen und Ihnen von der nächsten Stunde an Geschichte 
vortragen, und zwar werde ich ohne weitere Betrachtung des Ansatzes und der 
Methode ein bestimmtes konkretes Phänemoen zum Ausgang nehmen, allerdings für 
mich unter der Voraussetzung, daß Sie die ganze Betrachtung vom Anfang bis zum 
Ende mißverstehen.%2  
 In the next class Heidegger did in fact proceed to the interpretation of the 
Epistles of Paul. However, it belongs to the truth that the $formale Anzeige% and the 
$so abstract% terminology that characterized it kept returning again and again in the 
interpretation of the Epistles of Paul; what is more, it formed the actual axis of the 
                                                                                                                              
amatter of fact, to philosophy&s self-understanding, and it was one of the focal points of the 
young Heidegger&s efforts. In the same systematic way as he began discussing it in this 
lecture, was he never to return to this subject any more; the topic appeared in his subsequent 
lectures only in an incidental way (see Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger!s Being and Time, 
172). 
1 See Ibid., 171.; Otto Pöggeler, $Heideggers Luther-Lektüre im Freiburger 
Theologenkonvikt%, Heidegger-Jahrbuch, Vol. 1,  Alfred Denker, Hans-Helmuth Gander, 
and Holger Zaborowski, eds. Heidegger und die Anfänge seines Denkens ( 
Freiburg/München: Alber, 2004), 188. The following note appears at Becker: $Infolge von 
Einwänden Unberufener abgebrochen am 30. November 1920%. 
2 $Philosophy, as I perceive it, finds itself amidst difficulties. On other lectures the student is 
ensured: on lectures of art history, he will see images, and on other lectures as well he will 
get what he expects. With philosophy, it is different, and I cannot change anything about it, 
since it was not me who discovered philosophy. However, I would like to escape this 
unfortunate situation, therefore I will interrupt these abstract considerations, and I will tell 
you stories as of the next class; namely, I will choose a concrete phenomenon as starting 
point, without any further considerations as to the starting point or methodology, with the 
preconception for myself that you will misunderstand the entire lecture from the beginning to 
the end.% GA 60, 65. As a matter of fact, the first class already contained the sobering 
remark: $Über das Eigentliche in der Philosophie selbst habe ich Ihnen nichts zu sagen. Ich 
werde nichts bringen, was stofflich interessant wäre oder zu Herzen ginge.% ($In can tell you 
nothing of the essential things of philosophy. I will present you nothing that would be 
interesting in subject, or move your hearts%.) GA 60, 5. He also began his first 1923/24 
Marburg lecture in a similar way: $Hier wird keine Grundlegung, kein Programm oder 
System gegeben: nicht einmal Philosophie ist zu erwarten.% (GA 17, 1.) $Sie sehen selbst, 
daß in der Tat das, was wir hier gewonnen haben, ein Geringes ist und es ein Mißverständnis 
wäre, das Gewonnene im Sinne einer Philosophie zu nehmen.% (GA 17, 276.) ($The lecture 
will lay no foundations, formulate no programme or system ! not even philosophy is to be 
expected [from it]%; $You can see for yourselves: what we have gained so far is very little, 
and it would be a misunderstanding to perceive those said as some kind of philosophy%.) 
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analysis. No record is extant however on the students& reactions to it, or whether and 
hoe they were able deal with it.  
 
VII. Life, religious life, paradigmatic life: primal Christian life experience as a 
being having become between rebirth and kairological time 
As previously discussed, in the years following the war Heidegger transformed 
Husserl&s transcendental (consciousness-) phenomenology into a phenomenology of 
life; this phenomenology of life, however, at a decisive point of its concretization, 
understands itself as a phenomenology of religion, or, more precisely, a 
(hermeneutic) phenomenology of religious life.1 It would be a misunderstanding to 
think that $religious life% should be conceived of as a regional specification of the 
wider generic concept of $life%: for Heidegger the phenomenology of religious life ! 
as he understands it in the pertaining lecture ! is not a subspecies of the 
phenomenology of life. Primal Christianity appears as a decisive paradigm for 
Heidegger from the point of view of the hermeneutic return to $life% (and not merely 
to religious life), that is to say, religious life seems to him most adequate to 
represent the characteristics of life. Meanwhile Heidegger, as apparent, understands 
life in an entirely worldly sense, as an actual, factual life. Such things as life after 
death, eternal life, or the immortality of the soul as possible philosophical subjects 
utterly fall outside his phenomenological perspective.2 Life is always an actual life, 
facticity. This may eventually be one of the reasons why Heidegger&s analysis 
focuses on the Epistles of Paul, that is, the secular life of the earliest Christian 
communities. His interpretive efforts center around primal Christian experience of 
life as it manifested itself in the believing life of the first Christian communities, 
around the dynamics of this experience, and its making accessible by the means of 
phenomenology.3  
                                                 
1 Making use of a possibility of refinement offered by the Hungarian language, one may say: 
the phenomenology of religious life is not a religious phenomenology, but simply a 
phenomenology without an attribute. $One can hear these days%, he says in a remark in the 
1927 lecture, $that my philosophical work is Catholic phenomenology. It is presumably 
because I am convinced that thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus understood 
something of philosophy ! maybe even more than the modern thinkers. Nevertheless, the 
concept of Catholic phenomenology is even more meaningless than the concept of Protestant 
mathematics.% GA 24, 28: $Man hat gesagt, meine philosophische Arbeit sei katholische 
Phänomenologie. Vermutlich deshalb, eil ich der Überzeugung bin, daßauch Denker wie 
Thomas von Aquino und Duns Scotus etwas von der Philsophie verstanden haben, vielleicht  
mehr als die Modernen. Der Begriff einer katholischen Phänomenologie ist jedoch noch 
widersinniger als der Begriff einer protestantischen Mathematik.% 
2 Death is analyzed in the same manner in the Being and Time, in a completely secular way. 
(Cf. SZ 248.) 
3 It may not be superfluous to specify that the expressions $primal Christianity% and $primal 
Christian% (life experience or religiousness) are obviously used in a twofold meaning: on the 
one hand in a historical-chronological designation, referring to the early history of 
Christianity, and on the other hand as analogies to other expressions of Heidegger, such as 
$original science% ! the first semester after the war began exactly by the discussion of the 
idea of philosophy as original science ($Urwissenschaft%, see GA 56/57, 13 ff, also 95 ff.) ! 
Philobiblon  Vol. XVI (2011) - No. 1 
 
 224
 It is however one thing to claim that religion is primarily religious life, and 
it is quite another to say that religious life is the paradigm of life. Heidegger does 
not only claim the former, but ! precisely in the lecture on the phenomenology of 
religion, and in an emphatic way ! the latter as well. Primal Christian religiousness 
lies not only in actual life experience ! it is identical, co-significant with it. Christian 
religiousness and life experience overlap or coincide.1  
 The following considerations try to offer an explanation for this fact. In his 
early lectures Heidegger repeatedly discussed what he called the $self-sufficient% 
nature, $self-sufficiency% (selbstgenügsam, Selbstgenügsamkeit) of life.2 One of the 
fundamental meanings of this is that ! as Heidegger explains ! this phenomenon is 
$self-sufficient% insofar as it stays within life and within itself, that is to say, it is not 
visible (the concept of the Being-in-the-world in his major work will be similar to it, 
that is also so encompassing that it remains concealed in front of itself). Life 
remains within itself, it is sufficient for itself (it needs no philosophy, for instance), 
and its own imperfections or insufficiencies (that it may be very much aware of at 
times) do not lead past it: any attempt to surpass them will always only lead to 
another form of life. Therefore, because of its self-sufficient nature, life is not visible 
for itself.  
 Heidegger&s basic term for the characterization of early Christian life 
experience is the concept of $Gewordensein%, having-become. This is a kind of 
being which resulted from some kind of past happening or occurrence, its (present) 
being is due to that, while at the same time (and not unimportantly) it has also some 
kind of awareness, knowledge, or understanding about it, that is, it knows itself as 
such, it has an awareness or understanding about itself as such (such that it always 
already knows some past occurrence behind its back, as it were).3 This is such a 
                                                                                                                              
in the sense of $authentic%, $genuine%, $model-like%. $Primal Christian life experience% from 
this perspective is equal to an original experience, authentic, non-distorted from the point of 
view of the experience (of Christian faith). At the same time, the two levels of meaning ! 
historical-descriptive and normative-prescriptive ! are more often than not interconnected.  
1 See GA 60, 80.: $Urchristliche Religiosität ist in der urchristlichen Lebenserfahrung und ist 
eine solche selbst%. Ibid., 82.: $Urchristliche Religiosität ist in der faktischen Lebenserfah-
rung. Nachsatz: Sie ist eigentlich solche selbst.% Ibid., 131.: $christliche Religiosität ist in 
der faktischen Lebenserfahrung, ist sie eigentlich selbst%. (Emphasis in the original). 
2 See GA 58, 41 ff. 
3 See GA 60, 93 ff, especially 94.: $Das Wissen über das eigene Gewordensein stellt der 
Explikation eine ganz besondere Aufgabe. Hieraus wird sich der Sinn einer Faktizität 
bestimmen, die von einem bestimmten Wissen begleitet ist. Wir reißen die Faktizität und das 
Wissen auseinander, aber sie ist ganz ursprünglich miterfahren [...] Das Gewordensein ist nun 
nicht ein beliebiges Vorkommnis im Leben, sondern es wird ständig miterfahren und zwar so, 
daß ihr jetziges Sein Gewordensein ist. Ihr Gewordensein ist ihr jetziges Sein.% Cf. also 120: 
$Das christliche Leben ist nicht geradelinig, sondern ist gebrochen: Alle umweltlichen 
Bezüge müssen hindurchgehen durch den Vollzugszusammenhang des Gewordenseins [...]%. 
Furthermore, the following excerpt is also characteristic for the relationship of faith and theology 
as outlined by Heidegger, while it confirms Gadamer&s recollection mentioned above (see note 
2, p. 213), and also the relating theses of $Phänomenologie und Theologie% (and thus, so-to-
say, philologically $legitimates% itself): $Das Wissen um das eigene Gewordensein ist der 
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transformation of the original comportment which, at the moment when it becomes 
aware of it, wakes to its own consciousness as a being which has become that which 
it presently is. In other words: it is only and exclusively that which it is because it 
has become that ! and it also has some awareness of this becoming or having 
become. It is solely because it has become what it is that it is what it is ! and it does 
also have a specific awareness of it. Christian life experience seen from this 
perspective is not only a being that has become, but also ! inseparably ! a kind of 
accompanying knowledge as well, which at decisive points contains the fact that this 
becoming being, this being emerging from a past event was not initiated by itself, 
neither caused nor completed by it.1 Primal Christian life experience is the 
movement of turning away from the world and of turning towards God, a movement 
not initiated and performed by itself, and/but perceived as something always already 
lying behind.  
                                                                                                                              
Ansatz und Ursprung der Theologie. In der Explikation dieses Wissens und seiner begrifflichen 
Ausdrucksform ergibt sich der Sinn einer theologischen Begriffs-bildung% (ibid., 95.; cf. also 
124.). Yet another thing worth mentioning is that the concept of Gewordensein is entirely a 
$formally indicating%, that is, a phenomenological concept in the sense of $formale Anzeige%. 
This is not about the content or how to fill it up, not about the $what%, but about the $how%, the 
way it happens, the concept formally indicates and signals to a certain direction. That it is not a 
definition of content, is shown by the fact that Gadamer later used this same concept (with a 
slight grammatical-stylistic difference, in the form $gewordenes Sein%) with no difficulty or 
distortion at all for the characterization of Bildung. It is about a kind of knowledge which is at 
the same time being, more precisely being that has become ($gewordenes Sein%); it is thus 
equally a $way of knowledge or a way of being%, a knowledge $which is not detached from any 
being that has become%. (GW 1, 22, 317). What is more, the hermeneutic problem as such is 
characterized in Gadamer&s view by $distancing itself from  »pure« knowledge, detached from 
our own being% (GW 1, 319 ! emphasis in the original). Heidegger could have 
unproblematically accepted such formulation of the hermeneutic problem, all the more so 
because in the famous 1923 lecture he offered precisely an ontological radicalization of 
hermeneutics inasmuch as he reformulated it as the self-interpretation of facticity 
($Selbstauslegung der Faktizität%), emphasizing that $interpretation belongs to the existential 
characteristic of facticity itself% (cf. GA 63, 14 f.). Seen from this twofold example, the concept 
of Gewordensein articulates as follows. To be educated or to be Christian: both may thank their 
present being to some past occurrence, both ! as soon as they are and as long as they are ! 
always already have some happening and knowledge of it behing them ! the educated person 
was shaped, (trans-)formed, turned into a different person by his education, his present being is 
due to some past event, while (primal) Christian life experience similarly ! or perhaps even 
more radically ! experiences itself, its own, present being in the light of the event of $salvation%, 
$rebirth%, always happening in advance. A broad connection is created thus between Christianity 
and education (humanism), which cannot be overshadowed by the fact that they do not overlap, 
and that they may be at odds with each other in certain respects. Heidegger in this regard tended 
more towards an anti-humanist attitude (see on this István M. Fehér, $Hermeneutika és 
humanizmus% (Hermeneutic and Humanism), in Hans-Georg Gadamer - egy 20. századi 
humanista (Hans-Georg Gadamer ! a 20th century humanist), ed. Miklós NyírĘ (Budapest: 
L&Harmattan, 2009), 43-117, mainly 64-97.) 
1 See GA 60, 121 f. 
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 As a result of the strict relationship in Christian life experience of facticity 
and the knowledge thereof ! that is to say, because it is impossible to be a Christian 
without the knowledge of the previously epitomized movement that man has 
become one ! it can be legitimately claimed that early Christian religiosity 
experiences the facticity of life, or that it experiences life in its facticity ! or what is 
more, that is itself facticity.1 Seen from here, Christian religiousness or life 
experience, as a new being emerging by formation, by having become what it is, 
opens up actual life as such as rebirth, and makes possible some kind of a particular 
approach and access to it. Subsequent to this turn actual life opens up and becomes 
accessible as a particularly this-worldy life. Due to this formation, this having-
become, always perceived in the background and ! inseparably form it ! the 
consciousness connected to it, actual life emerges, in the light of some awareness, 
for itself as such, being actually that which it is. Thereby Christian life experience 
experiences the whole life or the wholeness of life: past, present, and future ! it lives 
time, and is itself this time.2 
 This time is directed towards the future. Or, we may also say: it starts from 
the future. When Paul the Apostle says: $the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in 
the night% (1 Thess 5. 2.), then he speaks about an imminent, future event without a 
precise timing. This future cannot be described in the form of objective contents; 
and the relating to it is not merely an (idle) expectation of some future event, but ! 
in contrast to the $sleepers% ! $wakefulness%. Sleepers cannot be saved, because ! as 
Saint Paul says ! they live in darkness. This means ! comments Heidegger ! that 
they cannot save themselves since they hold no possession of themselves, they had 
forgotten their selves3 ! and therefore they do not have any experience of life in its 
facticity. It is only the second birth ! we could say ! that is, rebirth, that opens up 
and makes accessible the first birth. We could also say: rebirth is the true, the actual 
birth.4 That which, inseparably from it ! as soon as it already is and is born ! 
                                                 
1 See above the places quoted in note 3, p. 224. 
2 See GA 60, 80. Cf. also ibid., 82., 104., 116. The interpretation put forward in this part of 
the present paper ! as well as some of the earlier subjects treated only sketchily ! were 
discussed in more detail in my following studies: $Religion, Theology, and Philosophy on 
the Way to Being and Time: Heidegger, the Hermeneutical, the Factical, and the Historical 
with Respect to Dilthey and Early Christianity%, in Research in Phenomenology, ed. John 
Sallis, vol. 39, 2009/1, 99!131. Expanded German version: $Religion, Theologie und 
Philosophie auf Heideggers Weg zu Sein und Zeit. Das Phänomenologische, das 
Hermeneutische, das Faktische und das Historische mit Blick auf Dilthey und das 
Urchristentum,% in Modern Homelessness, the Political and Art in Light of Machination  
Revisiting the Question of Nihilism. Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien, ed. Parvis Emad, 
F.-W. von Herrmann, et al., vol. 24 (Berlin: Duncker < Humblot, 2008),  103!144. 
3 GA 60, 103. 
4 Romano Guardini also emphasizes this nature of rebirth, opening up a beginning and a 
perspective, in a different context. See Romano Guardini, Vom Leben des Glaubens (1935), 
Unchanged reprint of the 5th edition (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1963). (First 
edition 1935), Topos-Taschenbuchausgabe 2nd  ed.,  1994, 45: $Gläubigwerden ist eben ein 
Anfang% $das eigentliche Glauben selbst aber ist ein Beginn lebendigen Daseins, und als 
solches nicht abzuleiten. Sucht man eine Entsprechung dafür, dann würde sie nicht darin 
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extends to the future. However, the unpredictable future cannot be dominated by 
chronological calculations. The believer becomes (and has always become) that 
what s/he is only in this insecurity towards the future. This character of kairos as 
opposed to kronos cannot be adequately represented by any kind of inherited 
concept of time.1 At the same time, the kairos expects a decision;2 the extension 
towards the unpredictable future, while giving up chronological calculations, does 
not sink into a passive, idle waiting. The $wakefulness% ! we may say, continuing 
Heidegger&s thought ! is none other than a sort of $readiness%, or ! anticipating the 
terminology of his major work ! $a running forth%, a $resolution%. $It is impossible 
to grasp this temporality drawing on any kind of objective concept of time%, says 
Heidegger.3 The meaning of this temporality is fundamental for the actual 
                                                                                                                              
liegen, wie ein Denkender aus seinen Voraussetzungen den letzten Schluß zieht, sondern 
etwa in dem Vorgang, wie morgens der Schlafende ins Wachsein auftaucht [...] er schlägt die 
Augen auf; er wird geboren%. 59: $Gläubigwerden = Hervorgang neuen Lebens%. These 
considerations further justify the above thesis according to which religious life is life par 
excellence, that is the one which opens up access to life.  
1 For more details on this point, see István M. Fehér, Martin Heidegger: Egy XX. századi 
gondolkodó életútja [Martin Heidegger: Path of thinking of a 20th Century Thinker] 
(Budapest: Göncöl, 1992), 66. 
2 As the Neues Theologisches Wörterbuch ckarifies the concpet, the Kairos means $adequate 
time%, $adequate opportunity% in the sense that at the same time it summons man for a 
decision; and this situation of decision ! while not containing the word itself ! repeatedly 
appears in the Old Testament. The completion of time, the completeness of time in Jesus& 
case refers to the nearness of the kingdom of God, which requires an immediate, urgent 
decision: conversion and faith. See Herbert Vorgrimmler, Neues Theologisches Wörterbuch 
(Freiburg: Herder, 2000), 335.: ^Kairos (griech. = die rechte Zeit, Gelegenheit), bezeichnet 
in der griech. Philosophie innerhalb einer Zeiterfahrung eine kritische Situation, die den 
Menschen anruft u. ihn zur Entscheidung herausfordert. Ohne den Begriff kommt die 
Entscheidungssituation im theol. Zeitverständnis des AT vielfach vor (»Zeit der Gnade«, 
»Zeit den Herrn zu suchen«). Nach Mk 1, 15 verkündete Jesus den »erfüllten K.« mit der 
nahe herbeigekommenen Herrschaft Gottes; dies verlangt ohne Zeitaufschub Entscheidung, 
Umkehr u. Glauben.$ It should also be added that this instance of decision with the help of 
the method and means of the hermeneutic phenomenology of the $formal indication% is 
contained in the concept of authenticity of Heidegger&s major work, namely in the concept of 
Entschlossenheit.  
3 GA 60, 104. That any kind of objectivistic concept of time fails here, is largeyl shared by 
recent theological interpretations. The $eschatology% entry in Rahner and Vorgrimmler&s 
Teológiai Kisszótár (Theological Dictionary) for instance writes, among others, that 
$Eschatology is not an account in advance of events to be happening "later#, but man&s [#] 
anticipation of the peremptory fulfilment of his existential situation. The purpose of this 
anticipation is that man perceives his own present as a concealed, peremptory future already 
present, which proves to be salvation already at present, if man accepts it as the act of God, 
the only disposer, the date and method of which cannot be calculated%. (Budapest: Szt. 
István, 1980), 189 f.; italics added. See also Herbert Vorgrimmler, Neues Theologisches 
Wörterbuch, 171 f.: $Rahner verwies auf die Notwendigkeit einer Hermeneutik biblisch-
eschatologischer Aussagen, bei denen es sich nicht um vorausschauende Reportagen des 
noch ausständigen Kommenden handle, sondern um Ansagen der »je jetzt« gegebenen 
Situation u. der in ihnen liegenden, auf die Zukunft gerichteten Möglichkeiten. [...] Das in 
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experience of life, but $due to the penetration of Aristotelian philosophy into 
Christianity these problems were not perceiced in the Middle Ages any more%,1 
while the present situation only further increases this disorientation. What we have 
to do with here is precisely the centre of Christian life, the eschatological problem ! 
but the eschatological problem had already been forgotten at the end of the first 
century.2 To such an extent, says Heidegger in a later characteristic remark, that the 
eschatological designation itself is false: inasmuch as it derives from Christian 
dogmatism, and it designates the doctrine of the last things. While the problem itself 
loses its meaning in this rigorous theoretical-disciplinary approach.3  
 $The time concept still alive in Paul and re-emphasized by Heidegger is not 
a Greek one%, writes Gadamer. $However, it was the Greek concept of time defined 
by Aristotle as the measure and number of movement that ruled the conceptual 
possibilities of subsequent ages from Augustine to Kant and Einstein. Thus the 
question of the Christian expectation of the last times as Heidegger&s most particular 
and profound problem had to remain open: was the Christian message not made 
unrecognizable by the influence of Greek thinking over the Christian experience of 
faith, and did it not alienate Christian theology from its most particular task?%4 
Regarded from here, Gadamer&s already quoted statement that $Heidegger 
appropriated the Harnackian thesis of the fatal Hellenization of Christian theology% 
is now understood in a more nuanced form.  
 
                                                                                                                              
vielfachen Bedeutungen auftretende Eigenschaftswort eschatologisch ist dann eindeutig, 
wenn es nicht für Voraussagen der Zukunft oder für apokalyptische Endzeit steht [..].% 
(Italics added.) 
1 GA 60, 104. 
2 Cf. GA 60, 104. $Zentrum des christlichen Lebens: das eschatologische Problem. Schon zu 
Ende des ersten Jahrhunderts wurde das eschatologische im Christentum verdeckt. Man ver-
kennt in späterer Zeit alle ursprünglich christlichen Begriffe. Auch in der heutigen Philo-
sophie sind noch hinter der griechischen Einstellung die christlichen Begriffsbildungen 
verborgen.% (Italics added.) The eschatological feature pervades and characterizes 
Heidegger&s entire path as a thinker. Ever since the very beginning, Heidegger had treated 
the question of being, a permanent inspiration for his own thinking, in a perspective in which 
the crisis of European history appeared as a result of historical development, as a kind of 
nadir ! as a product of neglecting or forgetting the question of being, exhausting the Greek 
beginnings, and falling from its heights !, while his own historical age appeared for him as a 
possible turning point, a cross-road. Heidegger&s seinsgeschichtliches thinking, coming to 
take shape after the turn in the 1930s and directed towards the surpassing of metaphysics, 
centers around the idea of $another beginning% ($der andere Anfang%), a new beginning 
following the first, Greek beginning of European history and philosophy, the preparation of 
which would be his task: the outbreak from the dead end of European history and the advent 
of a new age of the history of being, become projected over each other. This feature might 
have had some role in Heidegger&s short political activity. Hugo Ott pinpoints this feature of 
Heidegger&s habitus as a thinker, not without any critical poignancy, in the chapter entitled 
$Der beständige Advent% of his biographical sketch on Heidegger. Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: 
Unterwegs zu seiner Philosophie (Frankfurt / New York: Campus Verlag, 1988), 26 ff. 
3 GA 60, 115. 
4 Gadamer, GW 3, 313; cf. also ibid., 314. 





The present paper may be concluded with the following remarks: life experience and 
time cannot be rendered independent from each other. It is not accidental that in his 
major work Heidegger fixes the highest definition of (human) existence (the latter 
being the concept which takes the place of the early concept of life experience) as 
being in time, in temporality. Its primary dimension continues to be the future. 
Experiencing time is the same as experiencing the entirety, the wholeness of 
existence: time is the ultimate definition of existence. To exist totally means to exist 
temporally, while (entirely) filling out time; the complete life experience is the 
experience of time. The completeness of factical life experience is the experience of 
time itself (and not the experience of itself ! or of something else ! in time); it is an 
extended extension, the total possession of ourselves. Whoever has time, has an ego, 
a self. Who loses or wastes one&s time, loses (or even fails to gain) oneself.  
 Heidegger concluded his 1924 Marburg lecture on the concept of time with 
the following remark: $The question »What is time?« has changed into the question 
»Who is time?«, or more closely: are we time ourselves? Or even more closely: am I 
my own time?%1 
 
Translated by Emese G. Czintos 
 
 
                                                 
1 GA 64, 125. On Heidegger&s relation to theology, see my earlier studies: $Religion, 
Theology and Philosophy on the Way to Being and Time: Heidegger, Dilthey and Early 
Christianity,% A Companion to Heidegger!s Phenomenology of Religious Life, eds.  S.J. 
McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2010 [Elementa ! 
Schriften zur Philosophie und ihrer Problemgeschichte, vol. 80]),  35!65; and $Der göttliche 
Gott. Hermeneutik, Theologie und Philosophie im Denken Heideggers,% Das Spätwerk 
Heideggers. Ereignis ! Sage ! Geviert, ed. D. Barbariü (Würzburg: Königshausen < 
Neumann, 2007), 163!190.   
